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Domestic Corporations and the Alien Tort
Statute
Joseph Downey*
This Comment analyzes the history, jurisprudence, and contemporary status
of the Alien Tort Statute, which allows foreign citizens to bring suit in US courts for
violations of international law. It attempts to answer two unresolved questions relating to the Alien Tort Statute. First, can domestic corporations be sued under the
statue? Based on an analysis of the statute’s text, its history, and lower court decisions, this Comment argues that they rightly should be. This Comment will also
define what sort of conduct suffices for an Alien Tort Statute lawsuit to be brought
against a domestic corporation and concludes that a domestic corporation must
have violated international law either within the United States or in territory unclaimed by any nation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) gives federal courts jurisdiction
over civil tort actions brought by aliens in violation of the laws of
nations or treaties of the United States.1 Originally passed as part
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS lay mostly dormant until
1980, when it was resuscitated as a major area of both litigation
and scholarly debate.2 Since that time, a veritable explosion in
ATS litigation has occurred.3
A succession of Supreme Court cases has dealt with the scope
and application of the ATS, holding that federal courts should not
recognize private claims for violations of international law less
specific than those that were recognized when it was first enacted,4 that the ATS does not apply extraterritorially and that
“mere corporate presence” does not suffice to apply it domestically,5 that the ATS cannot apply to foreign corporate defendants
without congressional action,6 and that “allegations of general
corporate activity” are not enough for domestic application.7

1

28 U.S.C. § 1350.
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1397–98 (2018).
3
Beth Stephens, Judicial Deference and the Unreasonable Views of the Bush Administration, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 773, 811 (2008) (counting 185 cases between 1980 and
2008 claiming jurisdiction under the ATS in comparison to twenty-one cases from 1789 to
1980).
4
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 719, 732 (2004).
5
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013) [hereinafter
Kiobel II].
6
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1408.
7
Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1937 (2021).
2
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However, the Supreme Court’s ATS jurisprudence has, thus
far, left a pair of vital questions unanswered.8
First, it remains unclear whether the ATS can be used to
bring claims against domestic corporations.9 The Courts of Appeal
have disagreed on the answer to this question, with the Second
Circuit in particular obstinately refusing to recognize domestic
ATS corporate liability.10 The problems caused by this disagreement among the circuit courts include not only the fact that the
law is being applied in an inconsistent and contradictory manner,
but also that valid ATS lawsuits are being blocked. For example,
the Second Circuit in one case found that the “[p]laintiffs have
satisfied all of the jurisdictional predicates [for an ATS lawsuit]
but one,” which was the fact that “this Circuit has ruled that customary international law does not recognize liability for corporations.”11 The harms caused by this legal barricade are vastly exacerbated by the fact that the Second Circuit’s jurisdiction
contains New York City, the location for an enormous amount of
business and financial transactions.12 If someone were to want to
sue a domestic corporation under the ATS, there are good odds
that New York City would be one of the places where that lawsuit
could be brought. This question remains a pressing issue for domestic corporations, with one study calculating that approximately one-third of all ATS cases involved a corporate
8
At least one previous article has tread somewhat similar ground to this one. See
Amanda A. Humphreville, If the Question Is Chocolate-Related, the Answer Is Always Yes:
Why Doe v. Nestle Reopens the Door for Corporate Liability of U.S. Corporations Under
the Alien Tort Statute, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 191 (2015). However, that article is outdated; it
preceded both Jesner and Nestlé. It also focuses on policy to a much greater degree than
this Comment.
9
Kayla Winarksy Green & Timothy McKenzie, Looking Without and Looking
Within: Nestlé v. Doe and the Legacy of the Alien Tort Statute, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (July 15,
2021), https://perma.cc/7KZ8-EUHP.
10 For post-Sosa cases, compare Doe I v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th
Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021),
Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[C]orporate liability is possible under the Alien Tort Statute . . . .”), and Romero v. Drummond Co., 552
F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (observing that the ATS “grants jurisdiction from complaints of torture against corporate defendants”), with Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Kiobel I] (“For now, and for the foreseeable future, the Alien Tort Statute does not provide subject matter jurisdiction over claims
against corporations.”), aff’d on other grounds, 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
11 Licci by Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 834 F.3d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 2016);
see also In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litig., 808 F.3d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 2015)
(affirming dismissal of the plaintiffs’ ATS claims solely on corporate liability grounds under Kiobel I), aff’d sub nom. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
12 See Richard Florida, What Is the World’s Most Economically Powerful City?,
ATLANTIC (May 8, 2012), https://perma.cc/JQ25-9MN7 (describing New York City as the
most economically powerful city in the world).
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defendant.13 While only a small portion of ATS cases brought
against corporations have resulted in victories for the plaintiffs,14
one such case ended with a judgment for $80 million,15 and settlements for sums like $15.5 million16 have also been made.17 Merely
litigating an ATS case can cost a corporation upwards of $15 million in attorneys’ fees.18 Judgments in ATS cases brought against
non-corporate defendants have also reached high levels,19 including a default judgment for an eye-popping $190 million.20 Because
of these risks, it would be extremely beneficial for domestic corporations to be able to properly assess their current vulnerability
to lawsuits brought under the ATS. However, the Supreme
Courts’ refusal to answer this question and disagreement among
the circuits make this impossible. Moreover, much of the reasoning used by the Supreme Court to foreclose the applicability of the
ATS to foreign corporations could also apply to domestic corporations.21 At the same time, in the most recent Supreme Court decision to address this issue, Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, five justices
“saw no reason to distinguish between corporations and natural
persons as defendants,” but fell short of recognizing a right under
the ATS to bring claims against domestic corporations.22 Domestic
corporations should properly be exposed to liability under the
ATS.
13

Stephens, supra note 3, at 811–14.
Id. at 814.
15 Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (finding
this verdict in case where plaintiffs alleged they had been forced to work for defendant in
concert with Cuban government).
16 Settlement Reached in Human Rights Cases Against Royal Dutch/Shell, CTR. FOR
CONST. RTS. (Jun. 8, 2009), https://perma.cc/ZJY5-WNN5.
17 It seems that a good number of ATS cases have settled, but it is exceedingly hard
to find any concrete information on the terms.
18 Daphne Eviatar, A Big Win for Human Rights, NATION (Apr. 21, 2005),
https://perma.cc/V3EV-3LKE.
19 See, e.g., Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (judgment
for $70 million); Doe v. Rafael Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1159 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (judgment of $10 million ordered by court); Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2006)
(affirming jury verdict of $54 million); Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330, 336 (S.D. Fla. 1994)
(judgment for $41 million); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1360 (N.D. Ga.
2002) (judgment for $140 million).
20 Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1253 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
21 See, e.g., Jesner v. Arab Bank PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1402–03 (2018) (describing
the “general reluctance to extend judicially created private rights of action” and noting
that “[t]his caution extends to the question whether the courts should exercise the judicial
authority to mandate a rule that imposes liability upon artificial entities like corporations”).
22 William S. Dodge, The Surprisingly Broad Implications of Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe
for Human Rights Litigation and Extraterritoriality, JUST SEC. (June 18, 2021),
https://perma.cc/4TBH-N263.
14
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A further question remains: what is the analysis used to decide whether alleged domestic conduct is sufficient under the
ATS? It is clear from Supreme Court precedent that “mere corporate presence”23 and “allegations of general corporate activity”24
are not enough. This Comment will further argue that there must
be violations of international law on US soil or in areas outside
the jurisdiction of any nation to support an ATS lawsuit.
II. THE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AMERICAN COURTS
In a recent decision, a federal court stated that “there is no
authority in international law that United States national courts
must recognize, except insomuch as Congress or the President incorporates some part of it through constitutional channels into
national law.”25 However, this is facially untrue; international law
has long appeared in (and been recognized by) US courts without
any legislative or executive action at all. “When the United States
declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law
of nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement.”26 As a
result, “[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented for their determination.”27 For example, ambiguous statutes are construed to avoid “unreasonable interference
with the sovereign authority of other nations,” a rule of construction that reflects “principles of customary international law” that
“Congress ordinarily seeks to follow.”28 The Supreme Court has
also used international law as “persuasive authority to interpret
various provisions of the U.S. Constitution.”29 While there has
long been scholarly debate about the precise position of international law in federal courts,30 it is clear that such a role persists.31
23

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013).
Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1937 (2021).
25 United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 799 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
26 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004) (quoting Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796)).
27 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
28 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).
29 Rex D. Glensy, The Use of International Law in U.S. Constitutional Adjudication,
25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 197, 198 (2011).
30 Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998), with Harold Hongju Koh, Is
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998).
31 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 730–31 (2004) (citations omitted) (“We think it would be
unreasonable to assume that the First Congress would have expected federal courts to lose
all capacity to recognize enforceable international norms simply because the common law
24
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Of course, customary legislative and executive mechanisms
used to incorporate international law exist alongside the judicial
processes. The president has the “Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties” with foreign nations, and any “treaty ratified by the United States is . . . the law
of this land.”32 The president can also make “executive agreements with other countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate or approval by Congress.”33 Federal statutes and regulations
may further be established to implement treaty provisions or directly incorporate international law.34 Still, the products of all of
these mechanisms are subject to interpretation by federal
courts.35
III. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
The ATS is one of those statutes that directly incorporates
international law. The ATS is both short and seemingly simple,
stating that the “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”36 The text
of this statute has changed little since it was originally passed as
part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided that federal district courts “shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the
courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may
be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”37 One might
think that the ATS would be a common litigation path used by
foreign aliens, but the history of the ATS is scanty at best.
A. The Origins of the Alien Tort Statute
In a famous quotation, Justice Henry Friendly of the Second
Circuit referred to “[t]his old but little used section” as “a kind of

might lose some metaphysical cachet on the road to modern realism. . . . [t]he position we
take today has been assumed by some federal courts for 24 years . . . . Congress . . . has
responded to its most notable instance by enacting legislation supplementing the judicial
determination in some detail.”).
32 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226
(1996).
33 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003).
34 Am. Soc’y Int’l L., Uses of International Law in U.S. Courts, in BENCHBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW § I.C–5 (Diane Marie Amann ed., 2014), https://perma.cc/7UNRPWNA.
35 Id.
36 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
37 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77.
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legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us since the first Judiciary Act, no one seems to know whence it came.”38 Despite his
befuddlement, the history and background of the ATS is discernable from the available historical materials.39
The origins of the ATS are found during the Founding Era,
when “the inability of the [Articles of Confederation] government
to ensure adequate remedies for foreign citizens caused substantial foreign-relations problems.”40 Because the Continental Congress lacked substantive legislative powers, all it could do to try
to address this problem was pass a resolution urging the individual states to create judicial remedies for foreign individuals.41 Apparently, only one state followed the urging of the national government.42 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the United States
experienced diplomatic brouhaha in the following years that underscored the need for a broader grant of federal power to deal
with claims brought by foreign nationals.
First to occur was the 1784 “Marbois-Longchamps Affair,” in
which one Charles Julian de Longchamps, a Frenchman of ill repute, verbally threatened and then caned M. Marbois, the secretary of the French legation in Philadelphia.43 This incident proved
to be a great embarrassment to the national government; not only
did Longchamps manage to briefly escape arrest after convincing
his captors to allow him to change clothes at his home, but the
Continental Congress, being “obviously . . . incompetent to deal
with the situation,” “was compelled to request the states to urge
their officials to arrest an adventurer who had publicly assaulted
a member of the diplomatic staff of a great power.”44 The assault
became a national news story, with leading figures like Thomas
Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and George Washington
38 IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975), abrogated on other grounds
by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). Lohengrin is defined as a “mysterious knight” who refuses to answer questions about his origin. ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://perma.cc/CM22-86AW (last visited Feb. 13, 2022)
39 William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 488–89 (1986) (“Notwithstanding frequent complaints about the obscurity of section 1350’s origins, a thorough
study of available historical materials provides a fairly clear understanding of the statute’s
purpose.”). But see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718–19 (2004) (“But despite
considerable scholarly attention, it is fair to say that a consensus understanding of what
Congress intended has proven elusive.”).
40 Jesner v. Arab Bank PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1396 (2018).
41 Casto, supra note 39, at 490.
42 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716.
43 Alfred Rosenthal, The Marbois-Longchamps Affair, 63 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIO. 294,
294 (1939) (Longchamps had been involved in a series of previous run-ins with the law.).
44 Id. at 295, 299.
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discussing it in their letters.45 Virginia and Pennsylvania responded by passing legislation attempting to head off any future
such incidents, but no other states followed their lead.46
The second incident occurred during the ratification period
following the Constitutional Convention. A New York City constable “entered the house of the Dutch Ambassador and arrested
one of the Ambassador’s servants.”47 The Ambassador protested
to John Jay, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Foreign Affairs,
but Jay was forced to conclude “[t]hat the federal Government
does not appear . . . to be vested with any judicial Powers competent to the Cognizance and Judgment of such Cases . . . .”48
In response, the Framers used the Constitution to give the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over “all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls.”49 The First Congress built on this foundation in the Judiciary Act of 1789, in
which it created both alienage jurisdiction and the ATS.50 The
ATS does not appear to have been a topic of much interest to the
Congress, with no major mention of it in the records of congressional debates or the correspondence of the drafting senators.51
However, the Supreme Court got it right when it observed that
“the First Congress did not pass the ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf . . . . The anxieties of the preconstitutional period cannot be ignored easily enough to think
that the statute was not meant to have a practical effect.”52 The
ATS was passed in response to a specific problem, and it cannot
be assumed that it was not intended to have an immediate effect.
B. The Pre-Modern Era of the Alien Tort Statute
Mentions of the ATS in the federal registers are rare before
the 1980s. One author counted a total of only twenty-one cases
between 1789 and 1980.53 Because these cases are scattered

45

Id. at 299; Casto, supra note 39, at 492 n.143.
Casto, supra note 39, at 492.
47 Id. at 494.
48 Id. at 494, n.152 (citing Report of Secretary for Foreign Affairs on Complaint of
Minister of United Netherlands, 34 J. CONT’L. CONG. 109, 111 (1788)).
49 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 717 (2004).
50 Id.
51 Casto, supra note 39, at 495; see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 718.
52 Id. at 719.
53 Stephens, supra note 3, at 811.
46
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across nearly two-hundred years of history, this Comment will
confine itself to a discussion of the most relevant incidents.54
The first recorded case involving the ATS, Moxon v. The
Fanny, occurred in 1793.55 This was an action by the owners of a
British ship to get damages for its seizure in American waters by
a French privateer.56 The district judge stated that ATS was not
a proper avenue for the action, since “[i]t cannot be called a suit
for a tort only, when the property, as well as damages for the supposed trespass, are sought for.”57 Moxon is noteworthy because it
was brought as an in rem action under admiralty jurisdiction,58 a
procedure where, as a “legal fiction,” “the vessel itself is named as
a defendant.”59 The next important early case, which dealt with
the capture of a Dutch merchant ship by an American privateer,
was The Vrow Christina Magdalena.60 To answer the question of
“[w]hether this court has any and what jurisdiction relative to
matters arising on the high seas,” the judge turned to the Judiciary Act, noting that “[t]he court shall have . . . concurrent jurisdiction . . . where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the
law of nations, or a treaty of the United States.”61 Like Moxon,
Christina Magdalena was also brought as an in rem action.62 Unlike in Moxon, the plaintiff in Christina Magdalena was successfully able to establish jurisdiction under the ATS.63
If near-contemporaries of the ATS saw no problem with using
it to bring a suit against the artificial entity of a ship via an in
rem action, it is hard to believe that bringing a case against a
corporation, which was seen as “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law”64 would be
that different.

54 For an approximately complete list of pre-modern ATS cases, see Susan Simpson,
All* Alien Tort Statute Cases Brought Between 1789 and 1990, THEVIEWFROMLL2 BLOG
(Dec. 18. 2010), https://perma.cc/8XBQ-JFKB; Susan Simpson, Alien Tort Statute Cases
Resulting in Plaintiff Victories, THEVIEWFROMLL2 BLOG (Nov. 11, 2009),
https://perma.cc/J6GA-SD5Y.
55 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 948.
58 Id. at 947 (“The procedure here is in rem . . . .”).
59 David James DeMordaunt, Admiralty In Rem and In Personam Procedures: Are
They Exempt from Common Law Constitutional Standards?, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 331
(1989).
60 13 F. Cas. 356 (D.S.C. 1794), aff’d sub nom. Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. 133 (1795).
61 Id. at 358.
62 Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1942 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
63 Id.
64 Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
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The 1960s contained a series of cases where the ATS was
used to bring claims against unions.65 While the claims all failed
on a variety of grounds, none of them saw it as important that the
defendants were unions. The 1960s also had various cases featuring corporations as defendants, all of which also failed to reach
the merits of the issue.66 However, none of these cases mentioned
that there were any problems with applying the ATS to corporations, let alone domestic corporations. As an example, one can
look to the Second Circuit’s decision in IIT v. Vencap, Ltd. in
which the court rejected the ATS as the basis of jurisdiction for
an action against domestic corporations without any mention of
their identity. 67
There are two important takeaways from this overview of the
first 190 years of ATS litigation. First, all these cases take it for
granted that the ATS was enacted as a fully formed and immediately operational statute standing on the common law of nations;
there is no mention or implication that additional enabling legislation would be required to put it into action.68 In addition, both
corporations and corporation-like entities were sued under the
ATS without any potential issues being raised as to these types of
defendants. In Christina Magdalena and Moxon, the ATS was
used to sustain jurisdiction against a personified inanimate object
(a ship).69 In Khedivial Line, the court dealt with an ATS claim
against a labor union.70 And in Vencap the Second Circuit assumed that a corporation could be sued under the ATS.71

65 See Khedivial Line, S. A. E. v. Seafarers’ Int’l Union, 278 F.2d 49, 51–52 (2d Cir.
1960); Madison Shipping Corp. v. Nat’l Mar. Union, 282 F.2d 377, 378 (3d Cir. 1960); Upper Lakes Shipping Ltd. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 33 F.R.D. 348, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
66 Damaskinos v. Societa Navigacion Interamericana, S.A., Panama, 255 F. Supp.
919 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (suit against British and Panamanian corporations); Seth v. Brit.
Overseas Airways Corp., 216 F. Supp. 244 (D. Mass. 1963), aff’d, 329 F.2d 302 (1st Cir.
1964) (lawsuit against British corporation); Valanga v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp.
324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (lawsuit against domestic insurance company); Abiodun v. Martin
Oil Serv., Inc., 475 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir. 1973) (lawsuit against Illinois corporation).
67 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975), abrogated on other grounds by Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
68 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 721 (2004).
69 The Vrow Christina Magdalena, 13 F. Cas. 356 (D.S.C. 1794), aff’d sub nom. Talbot
v. Jansen, 3 U.S. 133 (1795); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793).
70 Khedivial Lines, 278 F.2d at 50.
71 Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001.
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C. The Modern Era of the Alien Tort Statute
The modern era of ATS litigation began in 1980, occasioned
by the Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.72 This
case dealt with a suit between Paraguayan citizens in the United
States, two of whom alleged that the defendant had wrongfully
caused the death of their relative through torture while serving
as Inspector General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay.73 The Second Circuit relied on the ATS to find that jurisdiction existed in
the case, stating that “[i]n light of the universal condemnation of
torture in numerous international agreements, and the renunciation of torture . . . by virtually all . . . nations . . ., we find that
an act of torture committed by a state official against one held in
detention violates established norms of the international law of
human rights, and hence the law of nations.”74 Like the pirate and
slave trader, “the torturer has become . . . hostis humani generis,
an enemy of all mankind.”75
The court continued by embracing an interpretation of the
ATS that brought it into the modern age, concluding that “it is
clear that courts must interpret international law not as it was in
1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the
world today” and embraced an expansive view of the “law of nations.”76 Finally, the Second Circuit finished off this sea-change in
interpretation of the ATS by establishing that the “constitutional
basis for the Alien Tort Statute is the law of nations, which has
always been part of the federal common law.”77
It is hard to overstate the impact Filartiga had on human
rights actions in the federal court system. One author regarded
that case as “opening the epic period of human rights litigation in
this country . . . . In a sense, all current human rights litigation
owes its fortune to Filartiga. The rediscovery of the Alien Tort
Statute was much like finding the Holy Grail.”78 Another author
observed that “[t]o its supporters, Filartiga is the Brown v. Board
of Education of international human rights, a decision that
spawned two decades of ground-breaking litigation.”79 One study
72

630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 878–80.
74 Id. at 880.
75 Id. at 890 (emphasis added).
76 Id. at 880–81.
77 Id. at 885.
78 David J. Bederman, Dead Man’s Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sovereign Immunities
in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 255, 256 (1996).
79 William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 687 (2002).
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in 2008 counted approximately 185 human rights lawsuits since
Filartiga, with twelve resulting in either a settlement or a judgment for the plaintiffs.80
The cases that dealt with the ATS in the two decades after
Filartiga, while interesting, are of limited precedential use owing
to the more recent string of Supreme Court decisions.
The other major event from this period that deserves mentioning is Congress’s passage of the Torture Victim Protection Act
of 1991 (TVPA), which provides that individuals who act under
the authority or color of law of a foreign nation are liable for damages stemming from acts of torture and extrajudicial killings.81
The TVPA, codified as a note following the ATS, sidestepped debates about whether the ATS required an additional statute to
enable claims to be brought under modern human rights law by
expressly creating a cause of action for victims of torture.82 The
TVPA has therefore been described as “the only cause of action
under the ATS created by Congress rather than the courts.”83
In the context of this Comment’s overall focus, it is important
to note that the Supreme Court has already ruled that lawsuits
against corporations are excluded from being brought under the
TVPA. In Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, the Supreme Court
looked to the language and vocabulary of the statute to determine
whether the defendant organizations could be held liable for the
imprisonment, torture, and killing of a naturalized American citizen.84 The TVPA “imposes liability on individuals,” but “[i]t does
not define ‘individual.’” 85 Therefore, the Court looked to the “ordinary meaning” of individual, concluding that “no one . . . refers in
normal parlance to an organization as an ‘individual.’” 86 Moreover, it observed that “this Court routinely uses ‘individual’ to denote a natural person, and in particular to distinguish between a
natural person and a corporation” and “Congress does not, in the
ordinary course, employ the word any differently.”87 Therefore,

80
81

Stephens, supra note 3, at 811.
The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73

(1992).
82
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Jesner v. Arab Bank PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1398 (2018).
Id. at 1403 (citing Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U.S. 449, 453–456

(2012)).
84
85
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566 U.S. 449, 449 (2012).
Id. at 453.
Id. at 454.
Id.
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the TVPA “authorizes liability solely against natural persons,” excluding organizations like corporations.88
IV. THE RECENT SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION ON THE ALIEN
TORT STATUTE
Starting in 2004, the Supreme Court has weighed in multiple
times on the new era of ATS litigation occasioned by Filartiga,
generally narrowing the circumstances under which ATS lawsuits can be brought.89
A. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Opening of the ATS Door
The Supreme Court first considered the ATS twenty-four
years after Filartiga had revolutionized its application in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain.90 In 1985, a DEA agent was captured, tortured,
and murdered in Mexico. Respondent Humberto Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez) was believed to be involved, and a group of Mexicans, including petitioner José Francisco Sosa, abducted Alvarez
and brought him to the United States.91 Alvarez was eventually
able to secure his release and he began a civil suit against Sosa
under the ATS for a violation of the law of nations.92
The Supreme Court used this opportunity to resolve some of
the largest outstanding issues relating to the ATS. First, Alvarez
argued that the ATS “was intended not simply as a jurisdictional
grant, but as authority for the creation of a new cause of action
for torts in violation of international law.”93 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument, concluding instead that the ATS was jurisdictional in nature based on its history, context, and language.94 Sosa, however, went further and argued one could not
seek relief under the ATS without a further enabling statute establishing specific causes of action.95 The Supreme Court disagreed with Sosa, explaining that “there is every reason to suppose
that the First Congress did not pass the ATS as a jurisdictional
convenience to be placed on the shelf.”96 At the same time, the
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Id. at 456.
Sarah E. McMillan, Novel Approaches to Expect in Inevitable U.S. Climate Litigation, ABA SCITECH L. 16, 20 (2021).
90 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
91 Id. at 697–98.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 713.
94 Id. at 713–14.
95 Id. at 714.
96 Id. at 719.
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Court, depending on early materials like Moxon, inferred that
Congress “intended the ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively
modest set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations,” a
list limited to offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe
conduct, and actions arising out of piracy and prize captures.97
Building on that foundation, the Supreme Court then opened
the door to the further creation of causes of action under the ATS
by federal courts, observing that nothing since the enactment of
the ATS “has categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an element of common
law.”98 After cautioning federal courts to be careful when recognizing a new cause of action,99 the Supreme Court then stated that
permissible claims under the ATS include only those based on “a
norm of international character accepted by the civilized world
and defined with a specificity comparable to” the offenses Congress had in mind when the ATS was originally enacted.100 To give
an example of this standard, the Court cited101 the early case of
United States v. Smith. 102 This case states that defining piracy
“may be done either by a reference to crimes having a technical
name, and determinate extent, or by enumerating the acts in detail, upon which the punishment is inflicted.” 103 While this is
phrased in a somewhat confusing way, it seems to mean that the
norm must either already have a known and accepted definition
or be carefully described. Smith also makes it clear that acceptance by the civilized world requires virtually universal approval: “And the general practice of all nations in punishing all
persons . . . who have committed this offence [of piracy] is a conclusive proof that the offence is supposed to depend . . . upon the
law of nations, both for its definition and punishment.”104
This newly established test was then applied to the case at
hand to conclude that illegal detention of less than a day does not
violate an international norm that is well-defined enough to create a federal remedy.105
97

Id. at 720.
Id. at 725.
99 Id. at 725-28 (observing a need to be cautious since the common law’s importance
had receded since 1789, federal general common law had been discarded, such a decision
is normally more suited to the legislature, the non-judicial realm of foreign relations is
involved, and the judicial role does not encourage creativity).
100 Id. at 724–25.
101 Id. at 732 (2004).
102 18 U.S. 153 (1820).
103 Id. at 160.
104 Id. at 162.
105 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738.
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The Court characterized the acknowledgment that further
causes of action could be recognized as an “understanding that
the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping.”106 As shall be
seen, the opening of this Pandora’s Door came to be regretted by
some on the Court, and many of the subsequent cases have focused on narrowing the aperture that Sosa created.
In a footnote, the Court noted that, besides the issue of the
definitiveness of the norm, “[a] related consideration is whether
international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a
given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a
private actor such as a corporation or individual.”107 This statement appears to imply that one should look to international law
on a norm-by-norm basis to determine whether a corporation
could be found liable, thereby implying that corporate liability is
possible (at least for some norms). However, Sosa contained no
further elaboration on this point.
B. The Creation of the Kiobel Test
A case dealing with the ATS next reached the Supreme Court
in 2013 when the Court heard Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co. (“Kiobel II”). 108 This case involved claims brought by a group
of Nigerian nationals who alleged that the defendant corporations
had aided and abetted the Nigerian government in violations of
the law of nations that occurred within Nigerian territory.109 This
case contains a pair of vital takeaways.
First, the Court decided whether claims brought under the
ATS can reach conduct in a foreign country.110 To answer this
question, the Supreme Court concluded that the canon of interpretation known as the “presumption against extraterritorial application” applies to the ATS.111 This canon presumes “that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States;112 thus, “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an
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Id. at 729.
Id. at 733 n.20 (emphasis added).
108 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
109 Id. at 111–12.
110 Id. at 115.
111 Id. at 116 (“But we think the principles underlying the canon of interpretation
similarly constrain courts considering causes of action that may be brought under the
ATS.”).
112 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
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extraterritorial application, it has none.”113 The purpose of this
presumption is to “ensure that the Judiciary does not erroneously
adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences not clearly intended by the political branches.”114 Since
“nothing in the statute [the ATS] rebuts that presumption,” actions seeking relief for violations of the law of nations occurring
outside the United States are entirely barred.115
The Supreme Court also set out the proper test for claims
that involve conduct both within and without the United States:
“[E]ven where the claims touch and concern the territory of the
United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace
the presumption against extraterritorial application.”116 As a
demonstration of how to do so, the Court cited to Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd.117 In that case, the Court had looked
to the “focus” of congressional concern in the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (“the ‘34 Act”) to determine whether a claim involving
some domestic and some foreign conduct could properly be
brought under that act.118 While the plaintiffs alleged that certain
banking executives had made misleading statements and manipulated financial models on American soil, the Court decided that
the focus of the ‘34 Act was not on the place where alleged deception had occurred, but on “purchases and sales of securities in the
United States.”119 Because the case did not involve any such purchases or sales (they had occurred in Australia), the case was dismissed.120 While clarifying, this citation to Morrison would prove
to be an area of contention among the lower courts and remains a
major source of confusion in ATS law.121
At the end of its opinion, the Court states that “[c]orporations
are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to
say that mere corporate presence suffices. If Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would be
required.”122 In other words, mere corporate presence is not
enough to hold a corporation liable under the ATS.
113 Kiobel II, 569 U.S. at 115 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S.
247 (2010)).
114 Id. at 116.
115 Id. at 124.
116 Id. at 124–25.
117 561 U.S. 247, 266–67 (2010).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 273.
121 Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 194–195 (5th Cir. 2017)
(listing various formulations used by circuit courts to apply Kiobel II).
122 Kiobel II, 569 U.S. at 125.
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This decision represented a major shift for ATS litigation.
Numerous cases had been decided based on conduct far removed
from the borders of the United States, including Filartiga itself,
which involved allegations of torture that occurred entirely in
Paraguay.123 Moreover, multiple Courts of Appeals had previously
outright rejected the application of the presumption against extraterritoriality to the ATS.124 Thus, the new standard made it
much harder for plaintiffs to bring cases.125
C. Jesner ends ATS Litigation against Foreign Corporations
Five years after Kiobel II, the Supreme Court dealt with the
ATS again in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC.126 The petitioners, most
of whom were foreign nationals, filed ATS lawsuits against Arab
Bank claiming that they or their family were injured by terrorist
attacks and that Arab Bank had used its New York branch to process transactions that benefited terrorists.127
The Supreme Court, surprising some,128 decided this case by
concluding that “foreign corporations may not be defendants in
suits brought under the ATS” without further action from Congress, basing this conclusion on two arguments grounded in theories of judicial restraint.129
First, ATS litigation against foreign corporations necessarily
implicates major foreign-relations concerns. The Court noted that
“[t]he principal objective of the statute [ATS], when first enacted,
was to avoid foreign entanglements” caused by a lack of a federal
forum for injured foreign citizens.130 However, this and other ATS
litigation were causing the exact opposite problem; “[p]etitioners
123 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980); see also In re Est. of Ferdinand Marcos, Hum. Rts. Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (involving arrests,
torture, and executions that occurred entirely within the Philippines).
124 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 747 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), vacated
on other grounds, 569 U.S. 945 (2013) (“We therefore conclude that the ATS is not limited
to conduct occurring within the United States . . . .”); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d
11, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that there is no extraterritoriality bar . . . .”), vacated
on other grounds, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
125 Rachel Chambers & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, The Future of International Corporate Human Rights Litigation: A Transatlantic Comparison, 58 AM. BUS. L.J. 579, 587–88
(2021).
126 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1386 (2018).
127 Id. at 1394.
128 Milena Sterio, Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations: The Future of the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 127, 143 (2018) (“[I]t is this author’s
opinion that the Court will likely side with the plaintiffs [in Jesner], but that it will strictly
limit corporate liability . . . .”).
129 Id. at 1403, 1407.
130 Id. at 1397.
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are foreign nationals seeking hundreds of millions of dollars in
damages from a major Jordanian financial institution for injuries
suffered in attacks by foreign terrorists,” with the only alleged
major connection to the United States being the aforementioned
banking transactions.131 The lawsuit against Arab Bank had produced diplomatic problems with Jordan for some thirteen years,
and various other foreign sovereigns had also registered their displeasure with ATS litigation.132 As the Court observed, “These are
the very foreign-relations tensions the First Congress sought to
avoid.”133 Moreover, any involvement of the judicial system in international decisions and disputes should be avoided for separation-of-powers concerns.134 “The political branches, not the Judiciary, have the responsibility and . . . capacity to weigh-foreign
policy concerns.”135
The other reason for barring ATS litigation against foreign
corporations was the fact that the Court has a “general reluctance
to extend judicially created private rights of action.”136 This hesitation “extends to the question whether courts should exercise the
judicial authority to mandate a rule that imposes liability upon
on artificial entities like corporations.”137 In general, the Court
said, the legislative branch is better suited to determine whether
new forms of legal liability would be appropriate.138 This line of
logic bears directly on whether domestic corporations can be
found liable, since the Court’s argument would apply to domestic
corporations just as easily as it does to foreign corporations. The
ATS makes no distinction between the two in its text, and the
Court itself is clearly discussing “artificial entities like corporations” in general.
Various additional arguments against general corporate liability under the ATS were made by Justice Anthony Kennedy in
an opinion joined by two other justices. These include the fact that
extending international law to individuals does not imply that artificial entities are similarly covered; the charters of international
criminal tribunals often exclude corporations; the TVPA, a statutory analogy to the ATS, restricts liability to individuals, excluding corporations; it has not been shown that corporate liability is
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id. at 1406.
Id. at 1406–07.
Id.
Id. at 1403.
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needed to serve the goals of the ATS; other remedies for plaintiffs
are available, including suits against individual corporate employees; and Congress might think that limiting liability to instances where management was actively complicit would be more
advisable.139 While these arguments do not have binding authority, they provide additional evidence that domestic corporate liability appeared to seriously be at risk in the wake of Jesner.
As a result, even though the Court did not directly analyze
domestic corporations in Jesner, some did predict that foreclosing
domestic corporate liability would be the next step for a future
Court.140 Indeed, Justice Alito directly questioned the need for allowing such liability in a footnote to his concurrence.141 As it turns
out, the exact opposite happened when the Supreme Court had
its next bite at the ATS apple.
D. The ATS Door Sways Erratically in Nestlé
The most recent Supreme Court decision dealing with the
ATS (and the one that occasioned this Comment) is Nestlé USA,
Inc. v. Doe.142 Six individuals from Mali claimed that they had
been trafficked into the Ivory Coast and used as slave labor to
harvest cocoa.143 Defendants Nestlé USA and Cargill bought cocoa
from farms in the Ivory Coast and provided technical and financial resources.144 The plaintiffs argued that the defendants aided
and abetted child slavery, and that even though both the provided
resources and their injuries occurred outside the United States,
they were able to bring suit “because petitioners allegedly made
all major operational decisions from within the United States.”145
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit had relied on an earlier precedent
to affirm that corporate liability under the ATS was possible (albeit with liability for foreign corporations barred after Jesner).146
139

Id. at 1400–01, 1403, 1405–06, 1408.
Alien Tort Statute—Domestic Corporate Liability—Ninth Circuit Denies Rehearing En Banc of Case Permitting Domestic Corporate Liability Claim, 133 HARV. L. REV.
2643, 2647 (2020).
141 Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1410 n.* (Alito, J., concurring).
142 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1931 (2021).
143 Id. at 1935.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Doe I v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Sarei v. Rio
Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 748 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated on other grounds, 569 U.S. 945
(2013)) (reaffirming “the corporate liability analysis reached by the en banc panel of our
circuit in Sarei v. Rio Tinto,” which had “rejected the defendants’ argument that corporations can never be sued under the ATS”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Nestlé USA, Inc.
v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021).
140
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This argument was based on the aforementioned footnote in Sosa,
with the Ninth Circuit stating that “Sosa expressly frames the
relevant international-law inquiry to be the scope of liability of
private actors for a violation of the ‘given norm,’ i.e. an international-law inquiry specific to each cause of action asserted,” including for corporate liability.147
One might think that this case would the opportunity for the
Supreme Court to resolve the issue of ATS domestic corporate liability by either rejecting or accepting the Sosa-based formulation offered by the Ninth Circuit. However, the Supreme Court
again did not reach this question. Instead, Justice Clarence
Thomas, writing on behalf of eight justices, held that the allegations of “general corporate activity” of the defendants within the
United States were not sufficient to support jurisdiction under
the ATS.148 As part of this holding, the Court recast the extraterritoriality analysis from Kiobel II, relying on the two-part analysis from RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community.149 Under step
one of that decision, one presumes that a statute applies solely
domestically, then determines whether the statute clearly and affirmatively rebuts this presumption.150 Nestlé concluded that Kiobel II had resolved this step by holding that the ATS does not
rebut the presumption.151 Under step two, when the statute does
not apply extraterritorially plaintiffs must show that “the conduct
relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States;” if
so, the statute can be applied domestically even if other conduct
occurred abroad.152 Thus, general corporate activity is not relevant to the focus of the statute.
Beyond these holdings, there is a mess of partial concurrences and dissents.153 The Court could not agree on how to interpret the scope of the ATS; three justices wanted to sharply limit
its applicability and three others wanted to maintain the Sosa interpretation.154
However, a total of five justices expressed a belief that domestic corporations are not immune from lawsuits under the

147 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 748 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.20 (2004)), vacated on other grounds, 569 U.S. 945 (2013).
148 Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. at 1937.
149 579 U.S. 325, 337 (2016).
150 Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. at 1936 (quoting Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 337).
151 Id. (citing Kiobel II, 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013)).
152 Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. at 1936 (quoting Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 337).
153 Id. at 1931.
154 Compare Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. at 1939 (Thomas, J., concurring), with Nestlé, 141 S.
Ct. at 1947 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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ATS.155 In his concurrence, Justice Neil Gorsuch stated that “[t]he
notion that corporations are immune from suit under the ATS
cannot be reconciled with the statutory text and original understanding.”156 Similarly, Justice Alito, while dissenting, stated that
“if a particular claim may be brought under the ATS against a
natural person who is a United States citizen, a similar claim may
be brought against a domestic corporation.”157 And, in a footnote
to her concurrence (which was joined by Justices Stephen Breyer
and Elena Kagan), Justice Sonia Sotomayor stated that she
agreed with Justice Gorsuch that “there is no reason to insulate
domestic corporations from liability for law-of-nations violations
simply because they are legal rather than natural persons.”158
While this messy result provides a guidepost for where the
current Court might end up in the future, it is unfortunate that
Nestlé did not directly answer the question of whether a domestic
corporation could be held liable under the ATS, prolonging the
current disagreement among the courts of appeal. The Second
Circuit continues to steadfastly maintain that domestic corporate
liability is impossible, despite the disagreement of every other circuit court to have made a ruling on this question.159
V. SHOULD DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS BE HELD LIABLE UNDER
THE ATS?
A. Supreme Court Precedent
The question of whether domestic corporations should be held
liable under the ATS has been only passingly addressed in binding Supreme Court precedent. Sosa’s twentieth footnote mentioned that a “consideration is whether international law extends
the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the
155

Green & McKenzie, supra note 9.
Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. at 1940 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
157 Id. at 1950 (Alito, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 1947 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
159 Compare Doe I v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014) (allowing
for corporate liability because “there is no categorical rule of corporate immunity or liability”), rev’d on other grounds, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021), Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co.,
643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[C]orporate liability is possible under the Alien Tort
Statute . . .”), and Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (observing that the ATS “grants jurisdiction from complaints of torture against corporate defendants”), with Kiobel I, 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (“For now, and for the foreseeable
future, the Alien Tort Statute does not provide subject matter jurisdiction over claims
against corporations.”), and In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litig., 808 F.3d 144,
157 (2d Cir. 2015) (declining to overrule Kiobel I on domestic corporate liability despite
the result in Kiobel II), aff’d sub nom. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
156
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perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as
a corporation or individual.”160 While this suggests that domestic
corporate liability is possible depending on the norm in question,
later cases dealing with the ATS have not seen fit to build on this
implication. Moreover, Jesner offered some reasoning in the context of foreign corporations that would seem to equally apply to
domestic corporations.161 Finally, Nestlé saw a collection of five
justices express support for domestic corporate ATS liability in
dicta.162
It is difficult to shape these scatterings into a coherent whole.
At best, one could say that Sosa suggests that domestic corporate
liability is possible and offers a framework for determining
whether it exists, Jesner suggests that domestic corporate liability is impossible, and Nestlé suggests it is possible, but without
offering a coherent framework or explanation. Therefore, it seems
advisable to look at other potential sources of guidance before attempting to answer this question.
B. The Text of the Alien Tort Statute
The modern version of the ATS, as previously mentioned,
simply says that the “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”163
While the statute clearly indicates who can bring a suit under the
ATS (an alien), it contains nothing bearing on the identity of potential defendants.
However, the text of the ATS can be helpful when compared
with the Supreme Court’s analysis of the language of the TVPA.
In Palestinian Authority, the Supreme Court concluded that the
language of that statute, which refers to “individuals,” forecloses
TVPA lawsuits from being brought against corporations.164 This
conclusion was based solely on the use of the word “individual,”
and by analogy, the lack of a similarly restricting word in the ATS
means that the text itself should not be interpreted to prevent
corporate liability. The Supreme Court has said “[w]e do not start
from the premise that this language is imprecise. Instead, we assume that in drafting . . . legislation, Congress said what it

160
161
162
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Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.20 (2004) (emphasis added).
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1402 (2018).
See supra notes 156–58.
28 U.S.C. § 1350.
Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 456 (2012).

2022]

Domestic Corporations and the Alien Tort Statute

503

meant.”165 When Congress included no words indicating any restrictions on the class of defendants liable under ATS, the Court
should trust that there are no such restrictions. And “[w]hen Congress provides exceptions in a statute, it does not follow that
courts have authority to create others. The proper inference . . . is
that Congress considered the issue of exceptions and . . . limited
the statute to the ones set forth.”166 The lack of any exceptions
(such as one, for instance, saying that ATS suits can be brought
against anyone except corporations) should therefore be a very
strong indication that the Supreme Court should not go beyond
what Congress intended.
C. Legislative Intent of the Alien Tort Statute
The utility of legislative intent has been heavily criticized,167
but this inquiry does shed some measure of light on the ATS. Discerning the legislative intent in the ATS is difficult due to a paucity of materials; as previously noted, there is no significant mention of the ATS in the records of congressional debates or the
correspondence of the drafting senators.168 Turning to historical
context, the incidents and concerns that motivated the passage of
the ATS have already been discussed.169 At the same time, the
status and position of corporations during the post-revolutionary
period when the ATS was enacted have yet to be investigated.
The corporate structure existed in a variety of forms in the
immediate post-revolutionary era.170 One scholar counted 317 corporate charters granted by the states in the eighteenth century
alone.171 Before the American Revolution, Blackstone described
how “[a]fter a corporation is so formed and named, it acquires
many powers, rights, capacities, and incapacities,” including “[t]o
sue or be sued, implead or be impleaded, grant or receive, by its
corporate name, and do all other acts as natural persons may.”172
165

United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997).
United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000).
167 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 3, 32 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that “with respect to 99.99 percent of the issues of construction reaching the courts, there is no legislative intent”).
168 Casto, supra note 39, at 495; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718
(2004).
169 See supra Part III.A.
170 Shaw Livermore, Unlimited Liability in Early American Corporations, 43 J. POL.
ECON. 674 (1935).
171 JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CORPORATIONS 26 (1917).
172 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 476 (1753).
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Early American cases make it even clearer that litigation involving corporations was not unusual; the Supreme Court observed in
1858 that “[a]t a very early period, it was decided . . . in the
United States, that actions might be maintained against corporations for torts.”173 In 1818, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
similarly noted that “from the earliest times to the present, corporations have been held liable for torts.”174 The original text of
the ATS plainly and clearly states that “all causes where an alien
sues for a tort” were within the jurisdiction of the district courts.
175 In a time and place where corporations were both common and
liable for tort lawsuits, it seems virtually certain that the original
understanding of the ATS would have applied it to corporations
just as easily as it was applied to individuals.176 Had a different
understanding been present at the time, it almost certainly would
have been mentioned in the legislative records or the opinions of
contemporary judges. Moreover, some have pointed out that
“there is no reason to believe that Congress wanted to avoid foreign relations problems created by individuals but not by corporations.”177
However, one must be cautious about putting too much
weight on this history. The modern scope of the ATS has been so
heavily modified via Supreme Court jurisprudence that it is questionable how much interpretive value the original legislative intent still possesses. Today, for example, a foreign corporation cannot be sued under the ATS,178 nor does “mere corporate presence”
suffice to support an ATS lawsuit.179 Neither of these requirements or anything remotely close to them appears in the jurisprudence, correspondence, or writings contemporary with the ATS
when it was first promulgated. In this sort of world, the original
legislative intent to apply the ATS to corporations ought to be
considered less persuasive.
D. The Jurisprudence of the Courts of Appeal
Most of the courts of appeals to rule on this question (five out
of six) have concluded that domestic corporations can be held
173

Phila., W. & B.R. Co. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. 202, 210 (1858).
Chestnut Hill & Springhouse Tpk. Co. v. Rutter, 1818 WL 2109, at *7 (Pa. 1818).
175 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77.
176 See Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 948 (D. Pa. 1793); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F.
Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795).
177 Sterio, supra note 127, at 132; see also Nestle USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931,
1942 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
178 See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1408 (2018).
179 See Kiobel II, 569 U.S. 108, 125 (2013).
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liable under the ATS. Of those finding domestic liability, two of
them, those authored by the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits, preceded Sosa and therefore are only marginally helpful.180 Since
Sosa, a clear majority of circuit courts to have ruled on the question of domestic corporate liability have found that it exists, although they take different paths to reach the same conclusion.
There is one important exception—the Second Circuit. This Comment will examine each of the post-Sosa cases chronologically
since they contain a great deal of interplay.
1. The Eleventh Circuit Focuses on the Text
In 2008, the Eleventh Circuit observed in Romero v. Drummond Co. that the ATS “provides no express exception for corporations” and that it “grants jurisdiction from complaints against
corporate defendants.”181 This finding was based on two arguments. First, paralleling the discussion above, “[t]he text of the
Alien Tort Statute provides no express exception for corporations.”182 And secondly, a previous circuit precedent had assumed
without discussion that the ATS could apply to corporations.183
2. The Second Circuit Rejects Domestic Corporate Liability
in Kiobel I
In 2010, however, the Second Circuit rejected domestic corporate liability under the ATS. Despite earlier circuit precedent
holding that ATS jurisdiction over multinational corporations
was permissible,184 the Second Circuit charted a new course in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel I), the predecessor to
the previously-discussed Supreme Court case of the same name.185
The court highlighted the footnote from Sosa which stated that
“[a] related consideration is whether international law extends
the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a
180 See Herero People’s Reparations Corp. v. Deutsche Bank, A.G., 370 F.3d 1192,
1195 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding that the “complaint in this case also stated an arguable
claim under the Alien Tort Act” where defendants were corporations); Beanal v. FreeportMcMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999) (assuming ATS applies to corporations).
181 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).
182 Id. at 1315 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
183 See Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005).
184 See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Khulumani
v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam)) (explaining that the
Second Circuit had “held that the ATS conferred jurisdiction over multinational corporations” that helped maintain apartheid).
185 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
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corporation or individual,” 186 taking this to mean that it had to
look to international law to determine whether corporations could
be held liable for violations of the laws of nations. After surveying
various authorities, the Second Circuit concluded that corporate
liability “is not recognized as a ‘specific, universal, and obligatory’
norm” under Sosa.187 In the court’s view, the charters and procedures of international tribunals, the text of international treaties,
and the works of publicists all demonstrated a lack of acceptance
of corporate liability as an international norm.188 That conclusion
was reaffirmed twice by the Second Circuit in the years after Kiobel II,189 and it seems unlikely that the results of Jesner or Nestlé
would change this result. The Supreme Court’s Jesner arguments
with regards to foreign corporate liability that could easily be applied to domestic corporations might even make the Second Circuit feel more secure in its conclusions.190 Indeed, this conclusion
is buttressed by a recent decision from the District Court for the
District of Columbia which declined to recognize ATS domestic
corporate liability under Jesner.191
3. The Ninth Circuit Focuses on the Text and Rejects Kiobel
I
The Ninth Circuit first recognized corporate liability in the
2011 case Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC.192 The court acknowledged the
Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel I, but rejected both its analysis
and its conclusion.193 The defendant in Sarei had argued against
corporate liability by looking “principally to treaties establishing
international tribunals for criminal trials . . . which do not explicitly provide for corporate liability.”194 However, the Ninth Circuit

186 Id. at 127 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.20 (2004) (emphasis added)).
187 Id. at 145.
188 Id. at 131–45.
189 See In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litig., 808 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir.
2015) (“We conclude that Kiobel I is and remains the law of this Circuit, notwithstanding
the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel II affirming this Court’s judgment on other
grounds.”), aff’d sub nom. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC on other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 1386
(2018); Licci by Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 834 F.3d 201, 219 (2d Cir. 2016)
(“In Kiobel I, we established that the law of nations . . . immunizes corporations from liability . . . . To the extent Plaintiffs submit that Kiobel I was wrongly decided . . . we are
not free to consider that argument.”).
190 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1402 (2018).
191 See Exxon Mobil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 3d at 85–93 (D.D.C. 2019).
192 671 F.3d 736, 747–48 (9th Cir. 2011).
193 Id.
194 Id. at 747

2022]

Domestic Corporations and the Alien Tort Statute

507

instead concluded that “[t]he appropriate inquiry . . . is to look at
the ATS itself and to the international law it incorporates.”195
Comparing the text of the ATS to that of the TVPA, which the
Ninth Circuit had previously found to “limit liability . . . to individuals,”196 the court followed Romero by finding that “[t]he ATS
contains no such language and has no such legislative history to
suggest that corporate liability was excluded.”197 However, while
the Sarei court explicitly rejected the Kiobel I conclusion that “the
statute itself is a complete bar to corporate liability,” it reached a
very similar result in its analysis of footnote twenty of Sosa, stating it requires “an international-law inquiry specific to each cause
of action asserted” and that “[t]he proper inquiry, therefore,
should consider separately each violation of international law alleged and which actors may violate it.”198 The Sarei court nevertheless reversed the dismissal of genocide and war crimes claims
against the defendant corporation, finding that the international
norms the claims were based on were “‘universal’ or applicable to
‘all actors,’ and, consequently, applicable to corporations.”199
Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that some norms were so universally accepted that the identity of the defendant did not matter.
The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed this finding after Kiobel II, observing that “for each ATS claim asserted by the plaintiffs, a court
should look to international law and determine whether corporations are subject to the norms underlying that claim,”200 and reaffirmed it again only with respect to domestic corporations after
Jesner ended foreign corporate liability.201
4. The Seventh Circuit Rejects Kiobel I and Embraces
Domestic Corporate Liability
The Seventh Circuit observed in Flomo v. Firestone Natural
Rubber Co. (also decided in 2011) that “corporate liability is possible under the Alien Tort Act” in a case involving a domestic

195

Id.
Id. at 747–48 (citing Bowoto v. Chevron, 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010)).
197 Id.
198 Id. at 748.
199 Doe I v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Sarei, 671
F.3d at 760, 765), rev’d on other grounds, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021).
200 Id. at 1022.
201 Doe v. Nestlé, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018) (“But Jesner did not eliminate all corporate liability under the ATS, and we therefore continue to follow Nestlé I’s
holding as applied to domestic corporations.”), opinion amended and superseded on denial
of reh’g, 929 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2019), rev’d and remanded on other grounds sub nom.
Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021).
196
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corporation.202 Like the Ninth Circuit, it based its argument
partly on an outright rejection of the logic of Kiobel I, which it
attempted to refute with a variety of arguments.203 The Seventh
Circuit, unlike the Second Circuit, felt that certain international
tribunals demonstrated that corporations have been punished for
violations of customary international law.204 Moreover, even if no
corporation had ever been found liable for such a violation,
“[t]here is always a first time for litigation to enforce a norm;” in
other words, the lack of examples is not itself evidence of a
norm.205 The court also observed that “corporate tort liability is
common around the world,” implying that it has attained the level
of international acceptance required for a norm under Sosa.206
In Flomo, the Seventh Circuit also made a very interesting
distinction between the substance of the law and the means of enforcing the law, stating that “[i]nternational law imposes substantive obligations and the individual nations decide how to enforce them.”207 Therefore, while the violations themselves are
determined by reference to individual law, it would be up to the
US court system to determine how the violations are punished
and whether corporations themselves or their employees would
be found liable.208 If a plaintiff had to show that civil liability for
a violation of international law was itself a norm, “no claims under the Alien Tort Statute could ever be successful, even claims
against individuals; only the United States, as far as we know,
has a statute that provides a civil remedy for violations of customary international law.209 210
E. Conclusion
Ultimately, domestic corporations can properly be held liable
under the ATS. This conclusion is based first on the ATS itself; as
the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits noted,211 nothing in the text limits the object of an ATS lawsuit. While the possible plaintiffs are
202

643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1017–21.
204 Id. at 1017.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 1019.
207 Id. at 1019–21.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 1019.
210 As a side note, the court observed that in rem actions against pirate ships give an
example of a nonliving entity being held liable for violations of international law. Id. at
1021.
211 Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008); Sarei v. Rio Tinto,
PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 747–48 (9th Cir. 2011).
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limited to aliens and the basis of actions is limited to violations of
the law of nations and US treaties, the ATS does not speak to
either potential defendants or possible remedies.212 Without textual language to stand on like the use of “individual” in the
TVPA,213 preventing ATS lawsuits from being brought against domestic corporations would be an extra-textual and unnecessary
limit on the scope of the statute imposed via judicial fiat and nothing more.
In addition, the legislative history and historical context
clearly demonstrate that corporations were not only common during the period when the ATS was promulgated but also able to be
sued in court.214 The members of the First Congress who passed
the ATS were almost certainly aware of this practice, but they
exercised their legislative powers granted by the Constitution to
not limit the targets of an ATS lawsuit. ATS lawsuits were also
brought against defendants analogous to corporations soon after
the ATS was passed.215
A clear majority of the Courts of Appeal have found that the
ATS allows domestic corporate liability. The arguments offered
by the Seventh Circuit are additionally particularly persuasive.
If the sources of international law must be interrogated to determine whether a corporation can be held liable for certain violations of international law, why should international law not also
determine the damages? Moreover, sheer numbers make it far
less likely that a corporation has been found to have violated international law; there are far more individuals in the world than
corporations. And, as the Seventh Circuit observed, a lack of precedent should not be taken to mean that a corporation cannot be
held liable.216
While the arguments the Supreme Court used to foreclose
foreign corporate liability in Jesner might seem to complicate this
situation, neither applies here. For one, there are obviously no
foreign policy concerns of the type that the Court worried about
in suits against domestic corporations.217 While the validity of the
Court’s “general reluctance to extend judicially created private
rights of action”218 must be acknowledged, no extension is
212

28 U.S.C. § 1350.
Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 456 (2012).
214 See supra Part V.C.
215 See Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (in rem action against
French-commissioned privateer).
216 Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011).
217 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018).
218 Id. at 1402.
213
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occurring here; domestic corporate liability has always been possible under the ATS. Domestic corporations were assumed to be a
proper target of ATS lawsuits in the 1960s,219 1970s,220 the
2000s,221 and the 2010s,222 and similarly artificial entities were
held liable in the period directly after the passage of the ATS.223
If the Supreme Court were to reach the conclusion that domestic
corporate liability under the ATS is possible, it would simply be a
confirmation of what has been implicitly or explicitly accepted by
most courts that have dealt with the ATS.
There is a total lack of sources distinguishing between corporate and individual liability prior to Sosa’s footnote twenty,224
which is the seed that led to Kiobel I.225 This footnote is the biggest
potential stumbling block to a finding that domestic corporate liability is possible under the ATS; it implies that one must look to
international law in order to determine whether a corporation can
be held liable.226 While the Ninth Circuit avoided this problem by
finding that certain norms applied to all actors, I would prefer to
simply not depend on Sosa’s footnote twenty whatsoever. It brings
in an unnecessarily complicated analysis to determine whether
“international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of
a given norm to the perpetrator being sued,”227 a test not required
by either precedent or the text of the statute. The footnote cites a
pair of cases, but they discuss whether or not certain conduct has
been accepted as a violation of international law, not whether a
certain category of defendant has been accepted as entities that
can be held liable under international law.228 The relationship of
these cases to the question of defendant is quite unclear, as is the
219 Valanga v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (lawsuit
against domestic insurance company, dismissed for other reasons).
220 Abiodun v. Martin Oil Serv., Inc., 475 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir. 1973) (lawsuit
against Illinois corporation, dismissed on motion for summary judgment); IIT v. Vencap,
Ltd., 519 F.2d 1005, 1008, 1009 n.13 (2d Cir. 1975) (suit against three domestic corporations), abrogated on other grounds by Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247
(2010).
221 Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (case
decided against foreign corporation, which means that domestic corporations could also be
liable).
222 Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014).
223 See The Vrow Christina Magdalena, 13 F. Cas. 356 (D.S.C. 1794), aff’d sub nom.
Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. 133 (1795); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793).
224 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.20 (2004).
225 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis
added) (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.20 (2004)), aff’d on other grounds, 569 U.S. 108
(2013).
226 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.20.
227 Id.
228 Id.
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reason why this “rule” needed to be added in the first place. Moreover, the Supreme Court itself seems to have placed little weight
on this footnote. It goes entirely unmentioned in Kiobel II229 and
is briefly mentioned twice in Jesner230 even though both of those
cases involved ATS lawsuits against corporations. Neither the
majority opinion nor any of the five justices in Nestlé who supported ATS domestic corporate liability bring it up at all.231 The
lower courts have attributed much more significance to it than
the Supreme Court thus far has.
I acknowledge that the vast majority of my logic could be extended to foreign corporations as well.232 However, the foreignpolicy concerns in that context would require a level of analysis
that places that issue outside the scope of this Comment.233 Moreover, the Supreme Court ruled on foreign corporate liability relatively recently234 while the question of domestic corporate liability
remains open.
VI. WHAT CONDUCT SUFFICES FOR AN ATS LAWSUIT?
The Supreme Court cases described above can be combined
into a rough framework to determine whether alleged conduct
supports a lawsuit under the ATS.
The foundation was created in Kiobel II, where the Court said
that “even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the
United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace
the presumption against extraterritorial application.”235 The
Court cited to Morrison to demonstrate, looking to the “focus” of
congressional concern in the ‘34 Act and concluding that it was on
“purchases and sales of securities in the United States,” thus the
presumption being displaced.236 The Court went on to note in Kiobel II that “[c]orporations are often present in many countries,
and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence
suffices” to defeat the presumption.237

229

Kiobel II, 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1399–1400 (2018).
231 Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021).
232 For instance, the text and legislative history contain nothing that would indicate
a bar to suits against foreign corporations.
233 See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1403, 1406–07 (2018).
234 Id.
235 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013).
236 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266–67 (2010).
237 Kiobel II, 569 U.S. at 125.
230
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Nestlé then modified the extraterritoriality analysis from Kiobel II using the two-part analysis from RJR Nabsico.238 Because
the ATS does not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality, plaintiffs must show that “the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States.” 239 If so, the statute can
be applied domestically even if other conduct occurred abroad.240
Thus, for a domestic corporation to be held liable under the
ATS, plaintiffs must show that the conduct relevant to the focus
of the statute occurred in the US, and this conduct cannot be either “mere corporate presence” or “general corporate activity” like
decision-making.241 However, the Supreme Court has never defined the focus of the ATS. 242
A. The Focus of the Alien Tort Statute
Kiobel II created a good deal of confusion around the extraterritoriality analysis for ATS claims. While it stated that claims
that “touch and concern the territory of the United States . . .
must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption
against extraterritorial application,” it also cited to Morrison,
which uses an inquiry looking to the “focus” of statutes.243 It was
unclear how these two cases interacted with each other, and a
wide range of interpretations arose in the courts of appeal.244
238
239

579 U.S. 325, 337 (2016).
Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1936 (2021) (quoting Nabisco, 579 U.S.

at 337).
240

Id.
Kiobel II, 569 U.S. at 125; Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. at 1937.
242 Green and McKenzie, supra note 9. The Supreme Court has also not specified the
sorts of conduct that would suffice, but that topic is itself quite broad and it is beyond the
boundaries of this Comment. It also seems to be an open question whether the original
offenses that the ATS applied to (offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct,
and piracy, see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004)), would still suffice.
243 Kiobel II, 569 U.S. at 124–25 (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S.
247, 266–73 (2010)).
244 See Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1028 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that
“the opinion in Kiobel II did not incorporate Morrison ‘s focus test” because it “chose to use
the phrase ‘touch and concern’ rather than the term ‘focus’ when articulating the legal
standard” and observing that “since the focus test turns on discerning Congress’s intent
when passing a statute, it cannot sensibly be applied to ATS claims, which are common
law claims based on international legal norms”); Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.,
845 F.3d 184, 197 (5th Cir. 2017) (following Morrison to “ask what the ‘ “focus” of congressional concern’ is with the ATS”); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516,
527 (4th Cir. 2014) (ignoring Morrison and holding that “[t]he ‘touch and concern’ language
set forth in the majority opinion [in Kiobel II] contemplates that courts will apply a factbased analysis to determine whether particular ATS claims displace the presumption
against extraterritorial application”); Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir.
2013) (focusing solely on the “touch and concern” language of Kiobel II); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 195 (2d Cir. 2014) (combining the “focus” and “touch and concern”
241
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However, Nestlé resolved much of the confusion in this area
by explicitly stating that “where the statute, as here [with the
ATS], does not apply extraterritorially, plaintiffs must establish
that the ‘conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the
United States.’ “245 The “touch and concern” language of Kiobel II
goes entirely unmentioned; it can therefore be assumed that the
Morrison analysis is the proper way to perform an extraterritoriality analysis under the ATS.246 The Court went on to note a disagreement between the parties on how to define the focus of the
ATS, with Nestlé and other petitioners arguing that “‘the conduct
relevant to the [ATS’s] focus’ is the conduct that directly caused
the injury” (thereby foreclosing any claims made under an aidingand-abetting theory) while respondents contend that the ATS’s
focus “is conduct that violates international law.”247 However, the
Court provided no clarification on this question, ending its analysis without resolving the disagreement.248 As a result, other
sources are required to define the focus of the ATS.
1. Supreme Court Precedent
Of the previous Supreme Court cases, Sosa speaks most
clearly to the overall purpose and aims of the ATS. Those who
drafted it had in mind the “sphere in which . . . rules binding individuals for the benefit of other individuals overlapped with the
norms of state relationships,” which consisted of “narrow set of
violations of the law of nations, admitting of a judicial remedy and
at the same time threatening serious consequences in international affairs.”249 As mentioned, these violations were restricted to
“offenses against ambassadors, . . . violations of safe conduct . . .
and individual actions arising out of prize captures and piracy.”250
Jesner adds that “[t]he principal objective of the statute, when
first enacted, was to avoid foreign entanglements by ensuring the
availability of a federal forum where the failure to provide one

inquiries into a single analysis); Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 590 (11th Cir. 2015)
(citing Baloco v. Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229, 1237 (11th Cir. 2014)) (noting that
Baloco’s “dispositive analysis” had “amalgamate[d] Kiobel’s standards with Morrison’s focus test, considering whether ‘the claim’ and ‘relevant conduct’ are sufficiently ‘focused’ in
the United States to warrant displacement and permit jurisdiction”).
245 Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1936 (2021) (citing RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
Eur. Cmty., 579 U.S. 325, 337 (2016)).
246 Id. at 1936.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 1937.
249 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004).
250 Id. at 720.
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might cause another nation to hold the United States responsible
for an injury to a foreign citizen.”251 Combining these characterizations together, one could say that the focus of the ATS is on
conduct that, like crimes against ambassadors, violations of safe
conduct, and capture or piracy actions, has a judicial remedy but
threatens foreign entanglements if no forum is provided.
2. Justice Alito’s Concurrence in Kiobel II
Near the end of the Kiobel II opinion, the Court briefly notes
that “[c]orporations are often present in many countries, and it
would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices.
If Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific
than the ATS would be required.”252 This passage directly follows
a citation to Morrison, implying that additional statutory specificity would be required for mere domestic corporate presence to
fall under the focus (as defined by Morrison) of the ATS.253
While lacking precedential value, Justice Alito’s concurrence
in Kiobel II sheds additional light on this passage, stating that
“only conduct that satisfies Sosa ‘s requirements of definiteness
and acceptance among civilized nations can be said to have been
‘the “focus” of congressional concern,’ when Congress enacted the
ATS.”254 Therefore, a claim brought under the ATS will be barred
by the presumption against extraterritoriality “unless the domestic conduct is sufficient to violate an international law norm that
satisfies Sosa ‘s requirements of definiteness and acceptance
among civilized nations.”255 In other words, the focus of the ATS
is a violation of “a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with . . . specificity.”256 Under Morrison, conduct qualifying as the “focus” of a statute must occur domestically to defeat the presumption against extraterritoriality.257
Because “mere corporate presence” does not qualify as a violation
of an international norm, the presumption applies, blocking any
claims that do not allege additional domestic conflict.258 To put it
even more shortly, under Alito’s interpretation, ATS claims can

251

Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1397 (2018).
Kiobel II., 569 U.S. at 125.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 126–27 (Alito, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010)).
255 Id. at 127 (Alito, J., concurring).
256 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004).
257 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266–67 (2010).
258 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 125 (2013).
252
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be brought only when an alleged violation of international law
defined with specificity has occurred within the United States.259
3. The Jurisprudence of the Courts of Appeals
While not all of the Courts of Appeals have analyzed the focus
inquiry of Morrison in relation to the ATS, those that have done
so have created definitions that fit with those suggested above.
The Second Circuit defined the focus as “conduct alleged to violate
the law of nations (or alleged to aid and abet the violation of the
law of nations), and where that conduct occurred.”260 The Fifth
Circuit stated the focus is “conduct that violates international
law, which the ATS ‘seeks to “regulate” ‘ by giving federal courts
jurisdiction over such claims.”261 The Eleventh Circuit has also
cited the Fifth Circuit’s definition with apparent approval.262 Finally, the Ninth Circuit limited itself to the text by defining the
“ATS’s focus” as being “tort[s] . . . committed in violation of the
law of nations.”263
4. Conclusion
Previous Supreme Court cases, a helpful Supreme Court concurrence, and the rulings of the Courts of Appeals all point in the
same direction: that the focus of the ATS is violations of the law
of nations. It is likely always implicit in these definitions that
such violations of the law of nations must be “defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms”
under Sosa.264 And, after Jesner, conduct must be domestic to fall
under the focus of the ATS.265 But should this be the case?
B. Restoring the Jurisdiction of the ATS
This Comment also seeks to establish that the Supreme
Court should revise its precedent to allow ATS lawsuits based on
259 Or, as Alito himself put it, “a putative ATS cause of action will fall within the scope
of the presumption against extraterritoriality—and will therefore be barred—unless the
domestic conduct is sufficient to violate an international law norm that satisfies Sosa ‘s
requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized nations.” Kiobel II, 569 U.S.
at 127 (Alito, J. concurring).
260 Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 195 (2d Cir. 2014).
261 Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 197 (5th Cir. 2017).
262 Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 590 n.21 (11th Cir. 2015).
263 Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350),
opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 929 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2019), rev’d
and remanded sub nom. Nestle USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 210 L. Ed. 2d 207 (2021).
264 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 602, 725 (2004).
265 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403, 1407 (2018).
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conduct that occurred outside the jurisdiction of any nation (and
which, implicitly, violates international norms defined with a specific comparable to those in Sosa). This would accord with both
the original understanding of the ATS and the Supreme Court’s
interpretations of the ATS’s purpose.
The Supreme Court has itself stated that when Congress
originally enacted the ATS, “individual actions arising out of prize
captures and piracy may well have also been contemplated,”266
and piracy is perhaps the prototypical example of conduct that
violates international norms outside any national jurisdiction.267
Moreover, unlike cases involving conduct in foreign nations,
actions that occur outside the jurisdiction of any nation do not
always implicate the foreign relations concerns that worried the
Court in Jesner.268 Nor would the Supreme Court recognizing this
area of ATS jurisdiction implicate its “general reluctance to extend judicially created private rights of action;”269 the Court’s own
precedent recognizes that the ATS was created in part to deal
with actions against pirates,270 so recognizing that the ATS allows
jurisdiction in such instances would simply be restoring what was
originally intended.
Kiobel II supports this proposition directly, with the Court
stating that “[a]pplying U.S. law to pirates, however, does not typically impose the sovereign will of the United States onto conduct
occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of another sovereign,
and therefore carries less direct foreign policy consequences” and
that “[p]irates were fair game wherever found, by any nation, because they generally did not operate within any jurisdiction.”271
Therefore, any other instances in which applying the ATS does
not intrude onto the dominion of a foreign sovereign could avoid
these same concerns and establish jurisdiction, even without a
domestic connection. As the Court said, “pirates may well be a
category unto themselves,”272 and that category (which might also

266

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720.
See, e.g., Pragya Singh & Shashwat Singh, Stemming the Tide of Crime: Navigating the Piracy Regime on International Waters, 31 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 19, 28 (2019) (“It is
common knowledge that the occurrence of terra nullius (no man’s land) is more frequent
on sea and almost negligible on land. This implies that there are jurisdictional concerns
over crimes on sea, since no particular state can claim exclusive jurisdiction, rendering
the crimes on sea more vulnerable and delicate . . . .”).
268 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1397–1407 (2018).
269 Id. at 1402.
270 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720.
271 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 121 (2013).
272 Id.
267
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contain other types of actors) is one over which ATS jurisdiction
ought to be possible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In 1789, the members of the First Congress exercised the
powers granted to them by the Constitution by allowing aliens to
bring lawsuits in US courts for violations of international law.273
Since that time, the clarity of the Alien Tort Statute has been repeatedly diluted by the Supreme Court. In recent years, partly
based on Supreme Court precedent, a circuit split has developed
with the Second Circuit refusing to recognize any form of corporate liability under the ATS. The history, text, and a survey of
other lower courts reveal that this is plainly incorrect. Even if the
Supreme Court disagrees with the structure of the ATS, it should
respect a proper exercise of legislative power and find that domestic corporate liability is permissible, reversing its historical practice of limiting the scope of the ATS.
While this might be unwelcome news to domestic corporations, this conclusion is unavoidable. Domestic corporations
should be on notice that conduct that violates specific international norms within the United States can be the basis for alienbrought tort suits, no matter what part of the country they happen to be in. The intention of Congress, as expressed in the ATS,
is clear, and it should be given force. Given that five votes in
Nestlé agreed that domestic corporations could be held liable under the ATS, this should hopefully occur the next time the Supreme Court has opportunity to analyze this question.
The Supreme Court should settle another area of confusion
by clarifying the “focus” of the Alien Tort Statute. The text, lower
court opinions, and this Comment’s analysis all agree that this
should properly be specifically defined violations of international
law occurring on American soil or in areas beyond the jurisdiction
of any nation. While such a conclusion is not as clearly foreshadowed by the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, this Comment looks
forward to the time when the proper interpretation of ATS jurisdiction has been embraced by the highest court in the land. 274

273

Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77.
Perhaps a future scholar will target some of the remaining questions in this space,
like whether aiding and abetting suits should be allowed under the ATS, what varieties of
conduct in the United States can break a specific international norm, and whether Jesner
should be revisited in light of the analysis contained within this Comment.
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